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IntrocLuotion
The Seaboard Air Line is a Southern road. In many ways
it is a typical Southern road and its problems are the problems
of other roads of that region. The main line of this railway
stretches from Richmond, Virginia, thru the southern part of
that state, thru the central part of North and South Carolina,
along the eastern coast of Georgia and on south to Tampa Bay
in Florida. This main line is 841 miles in length. There are
three principal feeders which run due west from the main line.
The northernmost of these extends to Atlanta^Georgia and
Birmingham, Alabama; the second from Savannah on the main
line to Montgomery, Georgia; the third from Jacksonville thru
the narrow northern strip of Florida to the Gatahoochi River
where it connects v;ith the Louisville and Nashville line to
New Orleans. The total length of all lines operated is 3,101
miles.
At present the railway predominance in the South
Atlantic states is divided between three great roads in a some-
what orderly manner, the general arrangement being, that the
Southern Railway occupies the highlands and the western part of
the coast plain; the Seaboard Air Line occupies the center of i
and the Atlantic Coast Line the eastern part, but all three
companies compete at most of the principal cities either
directly or thru affiliated companies. In addition there is
still a very large unabsorbed mileage of short lines. In
1, Annual Report, June 30, 1914,
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Georgia alone with only 6,8£9 miles of railway there 62 operating
companies. Thus the Seahoard Air Line has thruout its
career heen subject to active competition. This fact makes it
rather remarkable that the Seaboard has existed to the present
time as an apparently independent system.
The traffic of the Seaboard Air Line was made up as
follows in 1914.-^
Tons Per Gent
Products of Agriculture 1,488,562 . 14.30
Products of Animals 124,250 1.19
Products of Mines 2,743,137 26.35
Products of Forests 2,581,053 24.79
Manufactures and Mis-
cellaneous 3.475.984 33.37
10,410,986 100.00
It has been well said that the function of the Seaboard
Air Line is to collect the raw products of the South, and its
fruit and vegetables and to carry them to the centers of manu-
facturing and to the Northern produce markets; then to
assemble in the North that general merchandise which is there
produced and distribute it among the southern seaboard states,
as well as even ship it west of the Mississippi. Much of the
traffic is local. The average haul for cotton is estimated^
to be about 20C miles, for fertilizer, the transportation of
which forms a considerable part of the roads business, the
average haul is perhaps 150 miles. The other two roads are
somewhat more favorably situated as to traffic. The Southern
1. Annual Report, June 30, 1914 - p. 26
2. Railway Age Gazette
3. ibid, estim-.tes by Ray Morris, Managing Editor of Railway
Age Gazette
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Railway handles a larger proportion of thru business while
the Atlantic Coast Line has "better towns and gets more phosphate
rock from Florida and more vegetable traffic in the Garolinas.
The Seaboard Air Line Railway Company is the result of
consolidation. Parts of the road date back to the very early
construction of railways in this country. The Portsmouth and
Roanoke for example, was chartered in March 1832. In 1843,
the part of the line lying in North Carolina was seized for
the payment of debts. Hew corporations were then formed in
North Carolina and Virginia, and with permission of the legis-
latures of the respective states the two corporations were
consolidated in 1849 under the name of Seaboard and Roanoke
Railway Company."^ This formed the nucleus of the present
system. In 1882 the Seaboard and Roanoke obtained a controlling
interest (by purchase of stock) in the Carolina Central Rail-
way.^ It also obtained, in like manner , control of the Raleigh
and Gaston Railway which in turn held a controlling interest
in the Raleigh and Augusta Air-Line Railway.^ these four
roads made up a loose system known as the Seaboard Air Line
System with a total line of 516 miles. Each road maintained its
own organization and issued separate reports. By 1898 the Sea-
board Roanoke and the Raleigh and Gaston had jointly leased
the Georgia, Carolina and Northern, a line of 266 miles, extend-
ing from Monroe, North Carolina to Atlanta, Georgia. This, with
other short lines leased or held by stock ownership, brought the
mileage of the system up to 951 miles in 1898.
1. Poors Railway Manual 1888 - p. 646
2. Poors Railway Manual 1883 - p. 430
3. Poors Railway Manual 1883 - p. 435

4In the next chapter, the financial history of the road
will te taken up at this point and hrought down to 1909, hut here
it may he well to correlate in briefest form the main events
of that history, miring 1898-1900 a consolidation was effected
of the Seahoard system as ahove described and the Georgia and
Alabama Railway and the Florida Central and Peninsular system.
This formed the Greater Seaboard Air Line, so-called to dis-
tinguish it from the earlier loose affiliation. Soon after the
consolidation financial troubles began which finally forced
the road to apply to Kew York bankers for assistance, and led
to the formation of the Seaboard Company - a holding company.
This may be called the reorganization of 1905. It should be
regarded as an unsuccessful effort to ward off impending
failure. The system was unable to withstand the depression
of 1907 and 1908, and was consequently placed in the hands of
receivers under whom it was reorganized and discharged from
receivership in 1909.
A statement of some facts concerning this period 1898
to 1909 may be of interest in the present connection as it
will perhaps explain the causes of the failure and thereby
show some of the problems with which it was necessary to
deal in any successful plan of reorganization.

IEYEKTS LEADING TO TEE FINMCIAL READJUSTMENT OF 1905
(1898 to August 1904)
In DecemlDer, 1898, steps were taken to iDring atout a
consolidation of the roads that now form the SealDoard Air
Line Railway. At this time, the Georgia and Alabama Railway
(457 miles) was controlled by a syndicate, headed by John !•
Williams and Sons of Richmond, Virginia, and Middendorf
,
Oliver and Company, of Baltimore. This syndicate then pur-
chased a controlling share in the Seaboard Air Line system
and in February ^ 1899, obtained in like manner control of the
Florida Central and Peninsular system.-^ The three lines, thus
brought under a unified control, formed the basis of the new
consolidation. \Th.en consolidated into the new company, the
mileage, stocks, and bonds of the individual companies were
p
substantially as follows:-
Miles Stock Bonds
Seaboard Air Line
Railway 951 $7,258,650 ^>14,1dO,000
Georiga and Alabama
Railway 457 9.350,000 5,405,000
Florida Central and
Peninsular System 941 24.500,000 9.820.000
Total 2,350 #41,108,650 #29 ,385,000
It was rumored^ that the price offered for Seaboard and
Roanoke stocks was #200 for every #100 share. There v/as some
1. Poor's Railway Manual 1899 - p. 441
2. Railway Age Gazette, April 6, 1900
3. Railway Age Gazette, January 1, 1899

6suspicion at the time that the purchases were being made
for the Southern Railway or for the Atlantic Coast Line. In
answer to such rumors , John Shelton Williams, president of
the Georgia and Alabama Railway, and the moving spirit of
the consolidation, made official statement that the Seaboard
Air Line would be operated as an independent system.
An interesting contest took place in connection with
this consolidation. It will be remembered that the Seaboard
and Roanoke Railway was a part of the old Seaboard Air Line
System. Therefore, for the syndicate to purchase a
controlling share in the Seaboard Air Line System,meant that
it must purchase a controlling share in the Seaboard and
Roanoke Railway* The total issue of Seaboard and Roanoke
stock was 11,388,400 of which about ^832,100 was held in
the Hoffman pool. All the stock in this pool was subject to
sale upon the vote of three-fourths in amount of the certifi-
cates of deposit representing the same. Thomas F. Ryan owned
about one-fourth of the Seaboard and Roanoke stock
,
but not
as large a proportion of ths?-. in the pool. For two years past
he had been trying to get control of the property of the
Seaboard system. G onsequently, he strongly opposed the sale
of this stock 5 and applied to the oovoct for an injunction to
prevent his shares in the pool being sold. His application
was denied, and the consolidation went on as planned. In this
incident is a clash of personal interests whose contests for
control form a large part of Seaboard financial history.
Syndicate certificates ,representing the purchased shares,,
were sold to the public,but the management remained in the

7hands of the syndicate and later in the hands of a voting trust.
There were a number of gaps hetween the three consolidat-
ing lines. Work was hegun at once to close these. The Rich-
mond, Petersburg and Carolina Railroad Oompany was formed,
and immediately issued ^2,500,000 of 5 per cent "bonds to
raise funds for the construction of 103 miles of road connect-
ing the line at Ridgeway, North Carolina, with Richmond,
Virginia. The Seaboard Air Line guaranteed the bonds. The
Florida Central and Peninsular extended only as far north
as Columbia, South Carolina. A line was built 90 miles
northeast to connect it with the old Seaboard Air Line."*"
Prom Richmond north to Washington it was planned to lease or
get trackage rights over the Richmond, Fredericksburg and
Potomac Railroad. So many other lines, however, were interest-
ed in obtaining the same rights that it at first looked
hopeless for the new system. Finally, however, the six
lines interested, namely: Pennsylvania Railroad Company,
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, Southern Railway Company,
Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, Baltimore and Ohio Rail-
road Company, and the Seaboard Air Line Railway, united and
formed the Richmond-Washington Company which was to purchase
a majority of the voting stock of the desired line. Each of
the six roads hold an equal amount of the voting stock of
the holding company.^ Arrangements were also made by the
Seaboard for trackage rights over the Pennsylvania lines
into New York City. This completed a thru route from New
1.
2. Annual Report of Seaboard Air Line Railway, 1901 - p. 5.

8York to Tampa, iaorida, 75 to 100 miles shorter than the
existing lines.
Hopes for the new system were highland they seemed
justified for in the calendar year of 1899 the separate roads^
now consolidated J earned enough to pay all their interest and
rentals and have left a surplus ahout |1, 000,000, The year
ending March 1, 1900 gave the folloT/ving results:
-
Gross earnings $9,450,000
Uet earnings after
deducting operating
expenses 2,660,000
Pixed charges 1.460,000
Surplus " 11,200,000
Therefore^ it was contended by John Skelton Williams,
president of the company, "that these roads should make such
a good showing, while operated separately and "before they had
begun to reap any of the advantages of increased business and
of the economies of operation which will necessarily result
from the consolidation, certainly promises well for the
2future." On the strength of this optimism, and partly on
the strength of new line constructed, a considerable increase of
capitalization was made.^ The authorized stock for the com-
1.Railway Age Gazette, October 27, 1899
2. ibid.
3. It will be remembered that the stock of the constituent
companies had been held in a pool up to the time of consolidation
when it was held by the syndicate, who issued stock certificates
representing it. Likev/ise with this new issue a large part was
held by a voting trust and the real owners only held certifi-
cates of ownership and had no voice in the management of the
company. The exact proportion of stock thus held cannot be
ascertained but it was sufficient to vest active control in
the trustees.

9pleted system was increased to #75,000,000, with the proportion
of common to preferred ahout as 7 to 8. $62,500,000 of 4 per
cent consolidated mortgage honds covering the entire system
were also authorized. At the end of the fiscal year 1901
these honds were distrihuted as follows:-^
Outstanding $12,775,000
Held in pledge as security
for #10,000,000 collateral
trust honds 20,000,000
Reserved hy trustees for redeem-
ing the divisional "bonds
of the system 29.725.000
Total authorized $62,500,000
The complete indehtedness, including equipment trust honds,
at the end of the first year (June 50, 1901) amounted to
$54, 948, 913 • It will he rememhered that the honded in-
dehtedness of the separate roads had amounted to hut $29,385,000
On practically the same property we have thus had an increase
of funded deht of ahout 86 percent. Or stated in terms
of honds per mile; hefore the consolidation the separate
lines of the system v/ere honded at $12,403 per mile; after the
consolidation at $22,553 per mile. While $22,553 per mile
would not he an excessive deht for a road operating in a
more densely populated and prosperous territory, it was high
for the Seahoard. As Professor Riply has lately pointed
2
out J the over capitalization or conservative capitalization
c. Ki'ive cap it on of a road depends not on the
1# Annual Report, 1901
2. "Railroads," Vol II, - p. 85
r I
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absolute amount of capitalization per mile^but on the relativ -
ity between capitalization, and earning power. By this stand-
ard the Seaboard was heavily capit slized, for 79.8 per cent
of its "total income" (all income remaining after payment of
operating expenses) was required in 1901 for payment of
interest on bonds. This leaves out of account altogether
dividends on the capital stock. The size of this bonded
indebtedness will^perhaps, be better realized when we remember
that such stable and rich properties as St. Paul, Hew York
Central, and the Pennsylvania lines were at that time all
bonded for less than $20,000 per mile. This statement is
not made as a criticism of the policy of the road. It is quite
possible that the needed money for the improvements and new
equipment necessary for the operation of a large system
could not have been provided in a better way. The success of
the new system was not at all assured and for that reason
it would have been very difficult if not impossible to raise
the needed funds by sale of stock. Be that as it may^the
comparatively heavy load of bonded indebtedness has been one
of the causes of the road*s chronic weak condition.
In the year ending June 1, 1900^about 200 miles of line
had been constructed by the separate companies as described
the
above. In the first fiscal year oi^new system (ended June
20,1901) little road building v/as done but the rolling
stock was considerably increased. This year showed a surplus
of $329,659 after paying fixed charges and a dividend of 1.3
per cent on the preferred stock - the last dividend^it may
be noted, that was paid on this stock until 1914.
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In 190?: and 1905 the gross earnings steadily "but slowly
increased, and as no dividends were declared there was left
for 1902 a surplus of $820,256 and for 1903, ^832,480. But
during this time the funded deht was increased, \yhen
|3, 400, 000 of 6 per cent certificates of indehtedness came
due in 1902, ^8,000,000 of collateral trust bonds were issued
to redeem them , and at the same time to furnish money "to
meet installments on car trusts, to pay floating deht, and to
provide a fund of at least |1, 000, 000 for additional im-
provements."-'- The issuing of long time "bonds to meet in-
stallments on car trusts and to pay floating dehts^ should he
resorted to only in case of necessity. During the year 1902
there was practically no addition to the rolling stock, and
not a great amount of work done in improving the road bed.
In 1905 a considerable addition to the number of cars was
made 3 but all were paid for by equipment trust bonds - making
a total addition to that form of indebtedness of ^1,605,000
in the one year. In the same year, only $638,431 of the out-
standing equipment trust bonds were paid off ^leaving a large
increase in this item.
Another point that gives evidence of the financial con-
dition of the road is the poor quality of track (originally
intended for local traffic added to the fact that in the first
three years the management had been unable materially to im-
prove it. Light steel rails or iron rails are direct evi-
dence that the road is not being operated economically. Light
rails necessitate a small train load, and that means high
1,Railway Age Gazette, JuJ.y 5, 1901
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operating expenses. In 1901, 1961 miles of the 2603 miles
were laid with steel weighing 60 pounds per yard of rail or
less, or iron rails .-^ The improvement of this part of the
property was much needed, but such an improvement required a
supply of ready money. The need of this department seems to
haveAtyoical of the general conditions of the roadway and
equipment. Furthermore there was a large and increasing current
ihdehtedness. In short, the road had been showing all the
signs of weakness that ususlly precede a failure*
In Ootoher, 1903, csme the announcement that two of the
most prominent hanking houses of the Sotith were financially
embarrassed, and had found it necessary to ask the indulgence
of their creditors. These were John L. Williams and Sons
of Richmond, and J. William Middendorf and Company of Balti-
more.^ These companies had invested large sums in develop-
ing the South, and because of the unprofitable nature of
some of these enterprises, and of the extraordinary financial
situation of the latter part of 1903, this condition had come
about. Both of these houses had been heavily interested in
Seaboard affairs, and had been the financial backers of the
road. The immediate effect of this announcement was jtherefore^
a drop of 11 points in the quotations on the New York Stock
Exchange for Seaboard Air Line 4 per cent, first mortgage bonds.
These had stood at 851 on July 5, 1902, 79-i- on July 3,1903,
76 September 25, and then^as a result of this failure, dropped
to 65 in the next three weeks.^
1.Annual Report for 1901
2. Chrnnicle, October 3, 1903
^ ^
3. Quotations from Chronicle for the several dates. See
table Bo* in Appendix.
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Up to this time Southern cf$>italist8 had "been in control*
Now it hecame necessary to seek financial aid in other
quarters. Thomas F. Ryan, who had tr4.ed to get control of
the old Seaboard Air Line system in 1897 and 1898, and^ failing
in this had tried to "block the sale of stock to the syndicate
in 1899 and 1900, now stood in a strategic position. The road
was in need of money and he was in a position to furnish it.
Of course he and his associates insisted upon a share in the
control of the company. Ryan's representatives were therefore
elected to membership on the voting trust.
Here must "be mentioned another group who would have to
"be considered in apportioning the control of the company.
That is the Rock Island-Prise o group. In August of 1903
1
came the report that a large , if not a controlling, interest
in the Sea"^oard Air Line Railway had "been acquired "by
capitalists represented "by B. F. Yoakum, president of the
St. Louis and San Francisco Railway, and H. Clay Pierce^a
leading stock holder in the Mexicatn Central Railway, and
Okleigh Thome of the North American Trust Company of which
Mr. Yoakum was a director. As the Rock Island-Frisco com-
bination had been recently perfected^and the same group
held an active interest in the Mexicroi Central glance
at the railway map will show that to add the Seaboard Air
Line to this group would give a continuous route of affiliated
lines from Mexico City to Hew York by way of El Paso and
Birmingham, Alabama. The mutual benefit possible in traffic
relations was cited at the ti:re as the reason for the affilia-
1. Chronicle, August 15, 1903
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tion. It is also entirely possible that the financiers,
mentioned above, seeing the weak condition of the Seaboard Air
Line Railway desired a hand in the readjustment of finances
which it was evident would soon be necessary. The probability
of such a theory is increased when we note that this affiliation
was not long continued after the readjustment of 1905.
The shares of the company not having paid dividends
since 1901, and having little prospect of paying in the immediate
future^were selling at a low rate. It was estimated by
contemporary financial writers,"'" that the prices paid in the
above transaction was 15-|- for common, and 20 for preferred,
stock. The shares were obtained from the Southern share-
holders who, because of the money stringency, could not
meet the maturing loans against which the shares were pledged.
So we have three groups demanding representation in the
voting trust: (l) The original Southern capitalists, (2) The
Frisco Railway and its allied banking houses and, (3) The
Blair-Ryan-Old Colony Trust Company combination which was to
furnish the needed new capital. Upon completion of negot-
iations in November each of the above interests was given a
representation of five members on the board of directors.
The announcement that New York capitalists were to furnish
needed capital tended to strengthen confi dene
e
, and Seaboard
Air Line bonds regained 7^ of the 11 points they nad lost,
standing on November 21 at TZk,
In the latter part of November ^ an arrangement was made for
1. New York Sun, August 14, 1903
£. Chronicle, August 15, 1903
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a loan of $2,200,000. secured "by certain "bonds and stocks.
At the end of December, provision was made for an additional
loan of $750,000.-^ On Jfoiuary 3,1904, $5,000,000 of 5 percent,
collateral trust bonds due M^^rch 1, 1907 were offered for
sale. It may be said here by way of parenthesis that
the falling due of this issue of bonds during a period of
high money rates was one of the immediate causes of the
failure of 1907. The shareholders were to be given first
preference in the purchase of these bonds to the extent of
10 per cent of their holdings. With each Jg)l,000 bond was
offered a bonus of ^^5900 of preferred stock and ;|S1,600 of common
shares. While both of these shares were valueless as to
dividend paying power at that ti/ne^their method of issue is
significant in determining the amount of consideration that
should be given to them in a general reorganization of
finances. The issue was underwritten by a s^mdicate composed
of the New York bankers above named.
On Jc.nuary 2 ^ owing to the change of control ^Vice-President
Barr was elected to the position of president - succeeding
John Skelton Williams, v/ho still ,however^ retained a
position of considerable power as chainman of the board of
directors. The nev/ president was committed to an aggressive
policy of improvements. In his first annual report he stated
that the business of the road had outgrown its facilities,
and that to secure its share of the increasing business of the
S6uth,and handle it at a minimum cost, it was necessary to
provide new terminals, track,and other facilities. It was also
1. Annual Report 1904 - p. 8
2. Chronicle Vol. 78 - p. 104
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pointed out at this time that the Seaboard Air Line was en-
joying practically as high gross earnings as its more
successful neighbor, the Atlantic Ooast Line^hut that these
earnings were frittered away by high operating expenses. If
the operating ratio could be kept down as low as that of the
Atlantic Coast Line it was contended that the net earnings
would be sufficient to pay 4 per cent on both classes of
stock. For this the Williams interest (now out of control)
blamed the inefficient mana^snent 'vhile the management
complained of inefficient equipment. Williams and his
associates insisted that new capital was not needed. Part of
an official statement issued by them follows: "The company
is in a thoroughly healthy financial condition. Most of
the iip2,500,000 loan negotiated last fall and v/hich fell due
Jime 1, 1904 was paid off before its maturity. .. .The sjstem
now is absolutely in need of no further financiering unless
it should be decided to undertake certain new construction...."
This statement was c .lied out by a proposal of a holding
company by which more capital was to be raised but which called
for an exchange of 100 shares of the old company for 60 of
the proposed company. This excited so much opposition that it
was at last dropped*
In this first chapter of Seaboard affairs,we have seen
the practical consolidation of various disintegrated lines
and the construction of new connecting lines under the syn-
dicate headed by Southern capitalists. But owing to the poor
equipment, the sharp competition of its better equipped and
1. Chronicle, December 24, 1904
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perhaps lietter managed competitor, the Atlantic Coast Line,
the new road has not met with the brilliant success predicted
for it. Then vie have noted the entrance of new factors into
the control of the company and the subsequent discord, Finally
this opposition becomes so clear cut that the policy of the
road is practically at a deadlock, the Hew York interests
demanding more capital and extension 5and the Southern
interests opposing these demands. This was the situation
in August, 1904.

18
II
THE i^IMCIAL READJUSTMEHT OP 1905
This chapter will deal v;ith the activities of the new con-
trolling interests in readjusting the finances and extend-
ing the capitalization of the road. The changes constitute
the first readjustment of the Seaboard Air Line.
On August 27, 1904, Thomas F. Ryan and his associates
"bought enough of the shares from the Mi ddendorf-Williams
estate to give them a majority of the voting stock. The price
paid was 15 for common stock and 25 for preferred. As a result,
Jolin Skelton Williams retired from the "board of directors , and
the new factions were free to proceed with a plan of in-
creasing capital. In the following Decemher^it was reported
that a plan was "being perfected for the readjustment of the
finances of the company on a comprehensive hasis which ^it was
"believed^woiild meet the approval of the stock holders. In
June ^1905 ^the plan was made public. As the changes actually
adopted differed not materially from this plan, it may he well
to examine it in some detail. It may for convenience "be
referred to as the first Ryan plan. It provided for the actual
consolidation of the Atlantic and Birmingham , and the Seaboard
and Roanoke, Railroad companies with the Seaboard Air Line
COMPANY
Railway^and the creation by the conslidatedAof the following
new securities:-
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First preferred, 5 per cent , stock ,|18, 000, 000
Of which immediately issuable . . . .5^7,625,000
Second preferred ,6 per cent , stock ,;jl8, 000, 000
Immediately issuable 17,923,350
Common Stock '|36,000,000
Immediately issuable 35,446,930
Total authorized $72,000,0'00
Total •
5^60,995,280
This stock was to be exchanged for the outstanding
Seaboard Air Line stock according to the following plan:-
Bach |100 of the existing preferred stock
to pay ^)12«60 cash. Receives:
first preferred stock ^12,50
second preferred stock 75.00
commoh stock 12.50
Each ^100 of the existing common stock
to pay ^12.50 cash. Receives:
first preferred stock ^12.50
common stock 87.50
The Southern group immediately attacked this plan,es-
pecially that part of it which called for an assessment of
stock. Very shortly, Willi ans had a plan of his own which
would avoid the scaling down of stock.
The management ,c onfronted by such active opposition,issued
a detailed statement purporting to show that $7,625,000 in
cash (the amount provided by the plan) was needed to meet the
demands of the floating debt and to put the road on an
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efficient physical "basis. About ;j5,000,000 was to be used to
improve the equipment and the road bed.
It will be noted that up to this time the Ryan plan did
not call for a holding company, but merely for a consolidation
of certain parts of the Seaboard Air Line which had to this
time been operated as a unit because controlled by the same
syndicate. It was now proposed that they should actually be
brought under one charter. The holding plan which ultimately
was adopted was only decided upon after it was found im-
possible to get all the shareholders to assent to the original
plan. About 15 per cent of the shareholders persistently
refused to assent to the plan
,
so on May 15 a statement was
made public to the effect that "to avoid litigation and
delay" a holding company, to be known as the Seaboard
Company^ would be' formed on practically the same lines as the
proposed plan. The holders of Seaboard Air Line stock were to
exchange it for stock of the Seaboard Company on the terms
above outlined, each share, preferred and common, submitting
to a cash assessment of ^12.50. In the case of the holding
company the consent of only a majority of the shareholders
was necessary^ thou '^Vs of course, the consent of all would
be desirable. The proceeds of the sale of the first preferred
stocks of the Seaboard Company were to be advanced to the
Seaboard Air Line Railway. In return for Such money, the rail-
way would issue its notes or mortgage bonds to the Seaboard
Company. The total indebtedness for which the new company
could at any time become obligated was limited to ^500,000.

El
The shareholders of the Se^-hoard Air Line consented to the
issue of an additional mortgage on the property of the road
to secure an issue of |518,000,000 of 5 per cent honds to run
for not more than 10 years. The Seahoard Company was organiz-
1
ed therefore. May 15, 1905, under the laws of Kew Jersey,
Its authorized capitalization, as above described^ amounted
to t^72,000,000. The company acquired the stock of the Seaboard
Air Line Railway, as follov/s: preferred $21,323,600, common
$25,555,300 - total §50,878,000 of a total of Seaboard Air
Line stock outstanding of ;i^60,900,000. On July 1, 1905,
the pi in was declared effective.
This was the first readjustment of Seaboard finances.
Its principal features v/ere (1) an assessment of the stocks,
(2) an authorization of $18,000,000 additional bonds, and
(3) the formation of a holding company.
An assessment of stock is always a commendable action, for
it shows that the shareholders themselves have confidence in
the possibilities of their property. In this case especially
did it require considerable confidence in the future of the
company, for the ccsh assessment was almost as large as the
market value of the common stock, and it was 50 per cent of
the market value of the preferred stock. In other words,
the value of the common stock was practically wiped out by
the assessment 5 and a payment of $12.50 per share was required
for the privilege of p participating in future prosperity of
the company. It was provided that, in the event of a dissolution
of the Seaboard Company, the holders of Seaboard first pre-
1. Poor's Railway Manual 1905 - p. 1568.
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ferred stock were to receive its face value in cash. It will
"be noted that the smount of Seaboard Company first preferred
stock given for each share of Seaboard Air Line stock was
^12.50 - the exact equivalent of the cash assessment. So ,from
this point of view ^ those paying the assessment were simply
investing money. Nevertheless , the possible return of it was
contingent on the future eaming power of the company.
As a matter of fact, the stock holders who consented to the
assessment did get hack the cash invested in 191£ v/hen the
Seaboard Company was dissolved, furthermore ,the stock had
increased somewhat in value by that tiiie. In 1912,the common
stock ranged in value frcm 18 to 27^ end the preferred from
44 to 55. But in 1905 jthe future of the company was indeed
uncertain.
Assessment is a just method of raising money, for the benefit
of increased earnings accrue most directly to the share-
holders,while such increased earnings benefit the other
security holders only indirectly. The bond holder, in theory
at least, is protected by the value of the property as it
stands, but the only value of the stock depends on the earning
power, either immediate or prospective, of the property while
in the hands of the present owners. Therefore, if more cash
is needed for immediate purposes, it is only fair to obtain
it from the stockholders - the proprietors and managers of
the property.
In almost every case, as Professor Daggett points out,^ in
1. "Railroad Reorganization," - p. 354.
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which stockholders have suhmitted to an assessment the pay-
ment has been abundantly justified by the increased earnings of
the road. Of course ,the use of assessments w)uld be the
soundest and best method of raising money. It has the
great advantage of involving no increase in fixed charges.
This has been done in certain re organizations,but , obviously,
there is a limit beyond which stockholders will not pay
the assessment which in the case of the Seaboard Air Line
in 1905 was necessarily quite low.
The authorization of §18,000,000 of bonds was not such a
commendable feature,for, as has been shown, the road was
already carrying an excessive load of fixed expenses. It is
a quite gene, al rule of reorganization to cut down the fixed
expenses and raise the necessary money by sale of stocks
or income bonds. However, it is true that the road was
suffering more at this time from too high operating ex-
penses than from too high interest charges. The Seaboard could
better afford tc have a percentage of fixed charges to gross
than
earnings of EE ,7 /it could to have a percentage of operating
expenses to earnings of 71.4. Perhaps then, it was considered
that the advantage gained by better eouipnent and con-
sequent lower operating ratio would more than make up for the
increased interest charges.
\yhatever may have been in the riiinds of the management their
policy seems to have met the approval of the investing public
For
for the quotations Afirst mortgage ,4 per cent, bonds of the
road rose considerably upon the establishment of the new
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plan. During the first half of the calendar year 1904, the
value of these bonds had hovered about 69, During July and
the first part of August, while the New York capitalists v/ere
negotiating for control, quotations rose from 69 to 74, Then
in the week of August 27, when these men bought the shares of
the Williams estate, and thus gained entire control ^the
quotations rapidly went up from 74 to 82. During the weeks
in which the readjustment plans v/ere being perfected, they
stood about 90. These quotations and the comments of
contemporary financial writers show that ^whatever we now
think of the first reorganizationjit met with the approval
of investors of that day , and inspired confidence in the Sea-
board system.
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III
BVMTS LEADING a?0 THE RECEIVERSHIP AND REORGANIZATION OF
1908. (August, 1905, to January ,1908)
.
The financial readjustment of 1905 should he recognized
as merely an effort to stave off the failure toward which
the Seahoard Air Line was surely tending. It was not a
thorough reorganization,hut mereljj a plan to raise more
capital* When the effect of this injection of new capital
had worn off , the road was in a worse financial condition than
hefore^tho its physical condition had heen somewhat improved.
The outlook^however,in the summer of 1905 was bright. The
new and more powerful New York capitalists were in control;
the plan which they had offered had heen adopted; and, thereby,
new and needed capital had been provided; provision had been
made for the issuing of new bonds as it became necessary; and
the road had just completed a successful fiscal year. ltd
gross earnings were ^14,000,000 , as compared with a previously
high gross of |)12,000,000,and it was undoubtedly thought that
with the new regime the operating ratio would be lowered suffic-
iently to leave a considerable margin for profits. Beside all
this_,the depression of 1904 was past, and all indications were
for a period of prosperity for the country at large.
In the two fiscal years following the formation of the Sea-
board Company,the gross receipts were larger than ever before,
but in each year owing to high operating expenses and fixed
1. Wall Street Journal, Edition, August 1905.
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charges the surplus was smaller than in the preceding year.
The following figures give a brief summary of the income
account for the two years in question ancL^for purposes of
comparison jthe income account of 1905:--'-
1907 1906 1905
Gross earnings
from operation ^17,204,182 ^15,800,019 |14, 201,943
Operating ex-
Net earnings
from operation § 3,618,505 # 4,729,262 1 4,601,052
Taxes 517,471 517,831 481,858
Operating in-
come 1 3,101,034 $4,211,431 1 4,119,194
Other income 31,802 51,401 58.189
Total incorae 1 3,132,835 |4, 262, 832 1 4,1Z7,383
Interest, rent
als, etc. 3.437,026 3,131.254 3,005,474
Surplus |l, 131, 578 ^ 1,171,908
Deficit I 304,190
Operating
ratio 81.97 72.97 67.60
percent percent percent
A large increase in the ratio between operating expenses
and gross earnings will be noted in the above figures. In
1906j69.55 per cent of gross earnings was used in paying
operating expenses; in 1907, 78.82 per cent was used in this
way. Such an increase is very unusual and especially import-
ant in this case as it was due largely to this increase that
the year 1907, while having larger gross earnings than in any
1. Annual Report for 1907, 1906 and 1905.
rre »
I
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previous year of its history, actLislly resiilted in a deficit.
The increase in operating ratio in 1907 over that of 1906
was, as will he seen, ahout 9 per cent, ascrihahle as
follows to the various items that go to make up operating
expenses:
-
Operating Expenses for Year Ended June 30, 1907
Per cent Increase incr«ag« |n
1907 of this over
item to 1906 operation
gross ratio.
(1) Maintenance of
Way and
Structures |2, 205,997 15.43 |340,457 1.09
(2) Maintenance
of Equip-
ment 2,314,914 14.09 357,598 1.19
(3) Conducting
transport-
ation 7,827,312 47.65 1,671,379 6.93
(4) General
Expenses 599 .816 3.65 57,144 .06
Total Operat-
ing Ex-
penses $12,948,041 78.82 |2, 434, 580 9.27
Let us then split up these sub-items into their various
parts and endeavor to fiad some general reasons for the con-
sistent and large increases. The first two items sre very
similar, and prohahly f?re explainable on the same grounds.
(1) The increase of $340,457 in the item of Maintenance
of Way and Structures was occasioned
^
in part, by "general
repairs"^ charges for which increased by about ^152,000, and by
renewals of ties ^charges for which increaised by about |)121,000.
(2) Under Maintenance of Bquipmentj repairs and renewals of
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freight cars are the principal items showing increases. That
each of these increases should he due so largely to repairs,
seems to indicate that the management had allowed the property
to fall into a had condition, and now in a period of good earn-
ings were going ahout to make up for the neglect of past
years. Under the conditions existing in 1907, this may have
been the hest the management could do ,hut ,viewed as a whole,
it was certainly poor business policy*
The next division is that of Conducting Transportation
which is the largest part of operating expenses. 47 per cent
of gross earnings was used for this purpose in 1907, as com-
pared with 40 per cent for 1906. Thru all this discussion
it must he remembered that the road had handled a larger
amount of traffic in 1907 than in 1906 or any preceding year*
1907 1906 Increa.5£
Tons of Freight
Carried One Mile 1,023,498,550
Passengers Carried
One Mile 160,290,575
965,550, 942; 61, 947,388
135 , 826 , 215 : 24 , 464 , 160
With this increase of traffic,we would expect an absolute
increase of cost of conducting transportation but hardly an
increase in proportioL to gross earnings. Returning to the
item of conducting transportation ,we find an increase of
$142,178 of wages of engineers and firemen. 4452,350 more was
paid for fuel for engines than in the preceding year. Remember-
ing the increase of business as above pointed out,was such an
increase in fuel charges justified? The average cost per ton
of coal used increased from |2.29 to ^2.60.
The annual reports of the Atlantic Coast Line show that
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there was no increase in the price paid for coal "by that
company. There was a slight rise in the general price of coal
at that time } but hardly enough to account for the difference
mentioned, comhined with this is the fact that each locomotive
reciuired more coal to run one mile than in the preceding year -
in 1906 the average miles run per ton of coal was 19.41; in
1907 it was 17,48 miles. On the face of it, this seems to
indicate wasteful use* However ^ there had "been an increase of
57 in the number of locomotives in use. E ow if these new
locomotives had been of a larger type than the old ones,we
5i9uld expect a larger fuel requirement per mile, and also a
larger tonnage carried. The majority of them were ten wheel
freight locomotives and the effect of the new addition was
shown in the average number of tons of freight per ton mile.
This was 207.63 in 1907 and 194.02 in 1906. Thus the larger
locomotives and heavier train loads partly account for the in-
creased fuel per locomotive mile. But, even allowing for this,
the fact remains that there was an increase in the total
amount of coal used of about 26 per cent at the same time that
number of tons of freight carried one mile increased only
6A per cent. Y/ith large locomotives or small ones, such a re-
sult is quite conclusive proof of inefficient management.
There was also a considerable increase in charges against in-
juries to persons.
1. The price of bituminous coal at Baltimore fluctuated
as follows in the years indie ated:-
(Statistical Ab- 1901 - ^2.50 1905 - |2.60
Stract 1912.- 1902 - 2.50 1906 - 2.75
p. 571) 1903 - 3.25 1907 - 2.80
1904 - 2.25 1908 - 2.70
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An increase of business should, ordinarily, with
efficient management fie handled at a constantly decreasing
cost per unit of traffic. lispecially is this true of a
road such as the Seahoard,whose greatest difficulty has
always heen a spars ity of traffic. Each of the ahove items
points to the one conclusion - mismanagement and wasteful
operation. A writer of that day"^, comparing the Atlantic
Coast Line and the Seahoard Air Line, maintained that the
general line of the employees of the latter road were not
as "high grade" as those of its more successful conpetitor.
Not only, said he, was the quality of the individual workers
lower >but there was lacking an "esprit de corps" and loyalty
which the Atlantic Coast Line held to he a valuable asset.
This is quite possibly true, and even this fault must^in the
final analysis, be held against the policy of the managers.
There is one other division under the general head of
conducting transixtrtat ion that has not yet been discussed.
This is the charge for car mileage which incrcc^sed by
§245,400 in the one year. Payment of a balance of car mile-
age shows that the road p;:ying it has held in its own use
cars belonging to other roads_,and when this tmouht doubles
in one year, as it idid in 1907 and l:)OD_,it is probable that
woEn out equipment is not being replaced with new, or that
the amount of equipment is not keeping pace with the increase
of business. An increase of the debit due to car mileage
1. V/all Street Journal.
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is therefore usually regarded as a very undesirable sign.l
There are several re.isons why railroads have not favored
the extensive use of this form of security. One of them
is,that, as these "bonds rest on certain specified pieces of
eruipment_, they must necessarily he for-shoii: terms, and he
entirely paid off by the time that equipment is worn out.
This necessity of paying a certain part of the debt on
specified dates is a distinct disadvantage. It will be seen,
however, that such bonds ,because of the definite tangible
security , could be sold even when the credit of the ccmpany
is very low and therefore , despite their disadvantages, are
often resorted to in cases of emergency.
In 1901,the Seaboard had ^-2,453,913 of this form of
indebtedness; in 1904, |3, 442,348 ,which amount by 1907 had
been more than doubled, being at the latter date ;j7,417,000.
For v/luat purpose had this grt^at increase in equipment trust
bonds been made? It is usually assumed that railroads will
use such a means of finance only to add new property, not to
replace worn out equipment. Therefore , let us see what new
ecuipraent had been added to justify the equipment trust bonds.
The equipment inventory (in the compfoay^s report) shows the
following ^in the latter three year period,me nt ioned above :-
June 30, June 50, Increase
1907 1904
Locomotives 398 326 72
l,"It is not usual for roads to make car trusts or
equipment trusts, unless funds cannot be obtained in other
ways, as by sale of securit^ies. Speaking generally, car trusts
are a sign of poverty, altho there are exceptions, as, for ex-
ample, Pennsylvania, which has several car and equipment trusts'.'
-Woodlock, '^The Anatomy of a Railway Report," - p. 26.
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Passenger cars 233 £81 52
Freight cars 12^411 9,994 2,417
Com: any cars 615 360 255
' ])uring the same three ye ars , according to the reports of
the comp any ^ equipment trust "bonds were used to purchase the
following equipment :-
Locomotives Passenger cars J'reight cars
1905 10 10 1,024
1906 30 15 1,130
1907 45 35 2,815
Total 85 60 4,969 '
In other words, while equipment trusts were used to
purchase 85 locomotives ,the inventory shows an addition of
only 72; while equipment trust honds were used to .lurchase
60 passenger cars, the inventory shows an increase of only 52;
and while eouipment trust "bonds were used to purchase 4,969
carSjthere was an o,ctual increase of only 2,417. This leaves
13 locomotives, 8 passenger cars,and 2,561 freight cars,
purchased in this way, in excess of the number added to the
general inventory. The conclusion is that equipment trusts
were used^not only to purchase additional rolling stock, hut
&-1S0 to replace th-^t which wore out during the three year
period. When the Seaboard started to use short ti:.e honds
of this form to replace worn out equipment, nothing could
save them from final insolvency except a phenomenal in-
crease of earnings. Instead of an increase of earnings
came the industrial depression of 1907 and 1908.
The president, in his report of June 30, 1906, after de-
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scriting the prosperous and growing condition of the South,
pointed out the urgent need for "better equipment and new
terminals,which would permit the Seahoard Air Line to get its
share of the rapidly growing business of the South. This re-
port was m .de public in October. A month later the directors
and
decided ujjc.^/^iie voting trust approved of, the issue of part
of the ^18,000,000 of bonds^v/hich had been authorised by
the re^-d juetixient pls^n of 1905, is)6,545,000 of tLese bonds
were accordingly issued to run for tbirty years. Then in
MrTch,wl:en the ^4,665,000 of three year collateral trust
bonds cane due, they were extended to Moy 1, 1911. These two
operations increased the funded debt of the road from
$63,600,000, on June SO, 1906, to ^6 , 94b, 000 , on June 30,1907.
Another point of interest ,v.hich arose out of the form-
ation of the Seaboard Gompiiny, is the matter of dividends.
It has been noted in a previous ch-pter that the Seaboard Air
Line had not pc^id dividends, ei ther on its common or preferred
stock, since 1901. This was entirely proper^for not enough
had been e:J:ned to justify dividends. But v/ith the form.ation
of tlie Seaboard Company, 2^ per cent ,semi- cnnual dividends
T;ere declared on its preferred stock, the first of these on
July 16, 1906. How there ?/8S no good re son for this ch^aige
of policy,for earnings v/ere no gre.ter th.n before. The only
difference seems to be thct under the holding compaaay the
process was not so aPP^^rent as before. A great majority
(82.5 per cent) of Seaboard Air Line shareholders had ex-
changed their stocks, as bove described ,for Seaboard stock.
1. Report for 1907 - p. 7.
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In other words, the shareholders now own the Seaboard Company,
which in turn owns the Seaboard Air Line - the actual property.
The Seaboard Comp ..ny loans money to the rai Iw ay ,which ^in
turn,p;2ys interest on this money to the holding coup any. The
holding company then declares dividends out of the money
thus received. It is evident that the sime parties are con-
cerned in one case as in the other, and,as the net earriings
were not increased ,the property could no more afford to pay
dividends in the latter than the foimer case.
As has been seen by the income accounts ^t he year 1907
was disastrous in its results. It must be remembered that
this was the fiscal year and ended June 30, so that the
period of depression v/hich preceded the pcaiic of 1908 had
not yet set in. Business conditions generally had been ex-
ceedingly favorable thruout the vdiole y ar. Had this prosperity
cont inued ^the manageiiient might have been able to maJie up
for the deficit of 1907
,
in 1908. But these conditions did
not remain. In August
,
quotations for stocks and bonds began
to drop rapidly, and ,by Ilovember l,had reached tLe lowest
point in years. At the s^me time,the money rates begj-n to
rise, going from 6 per cent for prime coiiimercial paper, in
August, to 8 per cent - a point never since reached.^
In spite of all this, the eamings for tie holf year from
June ^0,to I)ecember 31, 1907, were better th..n those of the
corresponding months of 1906. Gross earnings for the last
six months of 1907 were ^319,806 in excess of those for the
corresponding period of 1906, while operating expenses in-
1.
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creased only $93, 795 ."^ Thus the net operating revenue
("before p;^ing taxes) was 4*1 » 833, 891, as compered with ^pl, 610, 877
in the Ic.tter half of 1906, .^n increase of v2E3,014. From
an operating point of view,theref ore jthe property v/as in
no worse condition at the end of the calendar year 1907
than at the end of 1906, save that it looked forward to a
slump in gross earnings due to the growing industrial de-
pression.
But this statement refers only to the operating revenue
from which,of course,must he paid taxes, int ereiit , and rentals,
Ovdng to the increase of honded iiLdehtedness_,raent ioiicd above,
even this amount fell shout ^588,000 short of meeting fixed
charges for the half year,
This was the condition then that confronted the management:
(1) The property even in a prosperous half year 7/as un hie
to pay its fixed charged. But as soon as the business
depression he{:an to affect gross earnings ^as it surely wov.ld
in the next six months, tliere v/ould he no possibility of meet-
ing those charges which it could not meet in prosperity,
(2) There was no possibility of r.ising money by sale of
more of the thirty-five year
., 5 per cent , collateral bonds_,for
it Y/ould be folly for such a road as the Seaboard to try to
float new bonds in such a period of tight money as then exist edF
(3) The m!^jiagement alleged (and it appears to be a just
oomplsint) that because of the money conditions it was very
1, Wall Street Journal February £8, 190b.
E, Partly due to the general financial conditions and
pfirtly due to the weali condition of the road ti.e price Seaboard
Air Line first mortgage bonds fell to the extremely low point of
59 in December. (See Chart in Appendix.)
-J

36
difficult to make prompt collections.
These were the immediate causes that led the managenBnt,
"by order of the stockholders ^to apply for a receiver on
January 1, 1908.
In attempting to find the causes of the failure of the
Seahoard Air Line, a ccxnparison with the Atlantic Coast Line
is significant. This principal competitor of the Seaboard
Yms in mpjay ways similc-r to it. However the Coast Line
succeeded ,while the Seahoard failed. Each was organized as
a system at about the same time. In each year of its history
the Atlantic Coast Line hud successfully met fixed charges,
paid dividends , and had a surplus. Some coiiparative facts
may serve to show the wealmess of the one and the strength
of the other:
-
Atlsmtic Coast Seaboard Air
Line Line
Miles Operated 4.246 2,610
Capital Stock (Com.) i|)48,537,000 ^37,021,000
Capital Stock (Pref.) vl, 596, 000
,
Ji^23, 895 ,000
Bonded Debt ;;;114,464 ,000 ^69, 945, 000
Bonded Debt per Mile §26,100 #26 ,760
There is here a striking difference between the out-
standing capital stock of the two roads. The Seaboard ^with
only 2,610 miles, had & capital stoct of al.out 61 million
dollars, while the Atlantic Coust Line issued on its
4,346 miles only 50 million. However ,this is not so important
as it might at first sight seem,for the Seaboard had not
paid dividends since 1901, and then only on its preferred stock.
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This capital stock would not "be a detriment to the road ex-
cept in case it desired to raise more money "by sale of
additional stock. Aside from this, the amount of capitalization
is a matter of indifference to a company, so long as it is
not in a position to pay dividends on any capital. It will "be
noted theit the "bonded indebtedness per mile of the two roads
was about equal.
Below is given parts of the income accounts for the t?/o
roads for 1907:--^
Atlantic Coast
Line ;
; Seaboard Air
Line
Gross earnings 5©26, 771,528
from operation
^16 ,427,945
Operating expenses* 19,587,378 : 12,948,043
Ket operating income 7,184,156 '. 3,479,900
Other income 2 „ 67::, 422 : 170,406
Total income 9,857,578 . 3,650,506
* This does not include taxes.
Operating ratio :-
1905 60.5 66,7
1906 6U.69 ;; 72.97
1907 73.17 : 81,97 per cent
While the first thing that strikes us in the comparison.
is the larger gross earnings of the Atl>j.iitic Co.-St Line, we
find that,when we make allov/.unce for the l.rger number of
miles operated, that this road had analler gross earnings per
mile than the Seaboard. Obviously then,it was not lack of
earning power that wrecked the latter road. But we find that
1. Arr^mged from Reports in Moddy's Manual for 1908,
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the operating expenses per mile more than make up for the good
showing in previous item. Here then, in the ratio between
operating expenses ..nd earnings from operation,lay the diffi-
culty that is Tiost strikingly shown hy such a comparison.
The comparative operating ratios for the years licted shows
the relative efficiency of the two lines. The high operating
ratio of the Seahoard was due partly to (l)an inefficient
operating force and (£) to poor equipment. £ven the Atlantic
Coast Line was not a model of efficiency ,hut there are certain
factors that make very low operating expenses for either
of these roads difficult of attainment: - (1) They are en-
ga^ed^ largely^ in carrying goods which are perishahle ,and
therefore which make necessary quick service and short
trains. (2) The two raods compete at so many points ,and
therefore shippers are in a position to demand quick service,
and that again makes short trains and high operating expenses.
Let us, then , summarize the ceruses of failure as mentioned
or i:; plied in this chapter. They wojre:-
(1) Too high operating expenses for the gross earnings.
This has been sufficiently dwelt upon.
(2) High funded debt. As a general proposition, the
lov/er the funded deht^the better. It is the source of charges
that do not rise and fall with varying revenue ,hut must be
met each year to avoid foreclosure. Such charges in 1907
took about §3,500,000 of the |16,000,000 gross earnings.
This point should not be over emphasized for the funded debt
of the Seaboard, per mile of line, was no higher thim that of

29
mejay roads which are considered in excellent financial con-
dition. Had it not "been for the other causes_^this would
prohahly not h .^ve caused troulile,
(2) Internal dissension . The conflict "between the
I'lew York and Southern groups has "been often touched upon.
With this conflict, it was difficult to settle on a definite
financial policy.
(4) Payment of dividends "by the holding company when
the money was needed for replacement and "betterment. The
pajTment of dividends v;hen equipment is not being maintained
intact is very much the ssme as paying dividends out of
capit al ^which of course is unjustifiable , and in some states
illegal,
(5) The issuing of equipment trust bonds to replace
worn out equipment the expense for which should have been
charged to maintenance of equipment and deducted from gross
earnings,
(6) Low density of traffic ov/ing to a rather sparse
population and back?/ard conditions of industry. This is a
it
cause of trouble for all the Southern roads, asAwas for the
granger and transcontinental lines in their earlier
history,
(7) The physical condition of the road from the start.
The system 7/as m--de up of anall lines that had been doing
a small "business. The road bed was poor ,and the rails too
light for service in a system which planned to do a large
through business,
(8) Because of the small profits of the road .investors
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had little confidence in it , and consequently it was difficult
to get new capital to remedy the defect just mentioned,
(9) The management of the road declsred adverse legis-
lation and increased tajres,to "be causes of their difficulty.
It is douhtful if the activities of the state and interstate-
commissions would act as a cause of failure. As to taxes,
there had been an increase since the organization of the road,
hut with the growing value of the road this sLo v.ld he ex-
pected. But between 1904 and 1907 there was a decrease of
taxes. The taxes for the fiscal years were:-
1901 1902 1903 1jC4 1905 1906 1907
^502,270 ^221,402 ^457,122 ^,533, 974 ^481, 858 J^517,851 v517,471
The following were immediate causes of the receivership
(10) Difficulty of collecting outstanding hills due to
the financial situation prevailing in 1907,
(11) Necessity for extension of bonds at a time when
it was practically impossible to raise new funds.
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IV
THE RiiiCrilVERSHIP
Receivership is usually looked upon as the defense of the
"bondholder 5 and as a condition to be avoided as long as possible
by the stockholders , for it of course takes control out of
their h^jnds. In this respect the receivership of the Seaboard
Air Line was the opposite of the general rule. On January
1 ,1908, application was made for a receiver,by the attorney
of the road, representing the stockholders. The application
assigned drastic legislation and the financial situation
as the causes of the difficulty."^ Judge Pritchard,of the
United States Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, to
whom the application was made , assented to it and appointed
to the position of receivers, S. Lfmcaster V/illisms and
S. Davies V/arfield. Later the court appointed Edward Lunean,
of Raleigh, Horth Carolina, i.s a third receiver to directly
represent the court. It will be noted in passing that one
of the causes of difficulty had been cortinued by these
appointments, namely, internal dissention. The first niined
receiver represented the Southern int erests ,while the second
represented the Hew York parties. It is difficult to see
why such on arrangement should have been mde. It seems to
1. The road "was being pressed by its creditors and
had neither the credit nor the resources with which to
borro?/. The condition of the money m rket together Vvith the
curtailment of net earnings and extraordinary expenditures
has seriously affected the revenues of the compLcny and it has
been become m^^nifest that if the system is to escape dis-
integration and be develpped as its opportunities permit, there
must be a readjustment of its securities which will give them
the stabi] ty and value to which they •xe entitled." - State-
|ient bj ^he^l^^gieral Counsel of the road. V7all Street Journal,
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have satisfied the New York group, even though,with their
preponderance of voting power,they would have been justified
in demanding a larger representation than the South,
Many people thought that, under the conditions^ appll cation
for a receiver was the wisest course for the man .geraent to
follow. A large part of the indebtedness was still secured
hy bonds on the separate divisions of the road,and an actual
foreclosure sale under any of these mortgages might have
resulted in a disintegration of the system. But now the unity
of the system was assured - for the time being, at least, -
some men professed to foresee a speedy rehabilitation of
the system. John Skelton Williams, formerly president , and
nov/ leader of the minority, made public the following statement;
"lly confidence in the possibilities of the system, under
proper management is unshaken. For the calendar year of
1907, the Seaboard Air Line and its affiliated lines earned
approximately vl9,000,000. On this basis of earnings,
over v6,000 per mile, the system ought to be operated at
an expense ratio of approximately 70 per cent or less. On
this basis,net earnings would have been for the past year
#5,700,000 or nearly ;p2,OOC,000 in excess of fixed charges.
With the return of normal business conditions and the
tremendous development vvhich has been going on vigorously
for the past ten years in the entire territory traversed by
the Seaboard Air Line system, the arrest of which development
can only be temporary, I believe th.t results still more
favorable thc^n these may be comfidently expected."
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Two protlems are always involved in a reorganization:
(1) to provide cash to discharge the floating debt , and (E)
to reduce fixed charges. The former can be accomplished
either "by selling new shares or by assessing those already
sold. The latter problem is solved either by arbitrarily
cutting down the indebtedness or exchanging the bonds for
stiares or other securities not requiring the payment of
fixed charges. Any one of these changes means a loss to some
class of shareholders or bondholders. But it must be
recognized that a loss has been sustained by the whole
body f invest ors J and a reorganization from this point of
view is a contest of opposing interests to determine which
class, or classes, shall bear the greatest purt of the loss.
This reorganization was no exception to this general statement.
The most pressing problem before the receivers was that of
providing the money needed to discharge the Seaboard's float-
ing debt. On June SO, 1907, current liabilities exceeded
current assets by more th^n v6 »C00,000 ^and this ::imount had
been considerably increased by Janu ry of 1908. True,there
was an unissued reserve of bonds in the trei^sury ^but to sell
bonds of a failing compf?ny during such a financial period as
J;unuary ,1908, V70uld h ve been unvase,even had it been possible.
The roi-ds credit, of course,was very bad. l^ew York
finsQcial w iters'^ expressed the hope for a "strong reorgan-
ization." They asserted that to assess the stock and scale
down the capitalization was the mo;i.t direct and desirable
method of dealing with the dilemma,
1. Wall Street Journal, J.aiu -ly 4, 1908.

44
The need of a reduction of fixed charges wss not so
immediate. True ,the fixed charges for 1907 had amounted to
^3,437,027, which was .-.'bout 20 per cent of gross earnings, hut
even that could he home under an efficient management and
"better equipment.
But hesides the two main pr ohlems ,the Seaboard presented
a t}-ird which is quite clovsely allied 7/ith that of pciying
off the floating debt, ncimely: to raise new funds for improve-
ment of road bed and equipment. As mentioned in a previous
chapter,the quality of road bed was very poor ^ and this with
the consequent small train loads account ed , largely, for ex-
tremely high operating expenses. The ill-timed attempt, in
1907 jto improve the standard of equipment ^was ,it will be
remembered J one of the immediate causes of the road's difficulty.
The petition for a receivership stated-'- that ,in order to carry
out the improvements then under way, at least ^600,000 would
have to be spent in the calendar year of 1908.
Before discussing the efforts of the receivers towards
a re org:.jiizati on jit will be necessary to describe the csgoital
stock and funded debt - the materials with which they h -d to
work. The statement given below is for June 50, 1909^but there
had been few changes since June 30, 1907.
The capital stock outstanding amounted to v6O,916,0OO,
divided between common and preferred as follov;s:-2
!• Railwci,y Age Gazette, Jcjauary 10, 1908.
. 2. From Poor's Manu -1 for 1908 and the Annual He-n ort
for 1909.
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Capital Stock
Authorized Issued
Preferred ^25,000,000 ^23,895,000
Common 50,000.000 37.021.000
75,000,000 60,916,000
The preferred stock was at 4 per cent, and participated
to the extent of 2 per ceat addition after common stock was
paid 4 per cent. Ahove this total of 6 per cent,the coomon
stock was to get all dividends declared.
Funded Deht (total ;ii)70,631,000)
^(a) §1£, 775,000 First mortgage, 4 per cent due 1950
Of this form ^75,000,000 v/ere
authorized; ^67,000 had been issued and dis-
posed as follows:-
^12,775,000 outstanding
20,000,000 pledged as security for
collateral trust "bonds
29,725,000 reserved for retire-
ment underlying bonds
4,500,000 in the treasuiy
$57,000,000 Total issued.
(Id) $10,000,000 Sefunding Collateral Tnist, 5 per cent, due
1911. Secured by deposit in trust of
^5520,000,000 of series "a"; redeemable at 105.
(o) 1 4,651.000 Three Year Collateral Trust (extended), 5
per cent, due 1911.
Were due March 1, 1907 but were fhen extended
1. Various issues have been designated by letters to
facilit^^"fc^ reference to them.
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to 1911.
Secured by a second mortgage on the Seaboard
Air Line property and by ii?6,963,000 of stocks
and bonds held in trust.
(d) ^6,345,000 General mortgage and Collateral Trust, 5 per
cent due 1937.
^18,000,000 of these were authorized by
reorganization plan of 1905. Secured by
same property as series "a" and "c".
(e) § 700,000 Two year Collateral Gold Botes, 6 per cent.
due 1909. Secured by deposit of series
"d" bonds.
(f) $30,000,000 Divisional Bonds
^27,615,000 of these have a prior lien to
series "a" the property of the road.
is) 5,853,000 Equipment Trust Obligations, average rate of
interest about 5 per cent, date of final p^-
ment varying between 1912 and 1917. Secured
by specific cars and locomotives.
(h) 5,760,000 Seaboard Air Line - Atlanta - Birmingham
First Mortgage, 4 per cent, due 1933, secured
by a first mortgage on the Atlanta and
Birmingham Air Line (193 miles.)
The interests concerned in this reorganization of
Sea"board finances are represented "by the above classes of
securities. How the receivers went ahout to arbitrate the
opposing claims , and to adjust the losses, will now "be described.
The receivers were ordered by the court to pay all in-
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stallments and interest due on January 1, 1908, on any equip-
ment trust "bonds of the Seaboord Air Line Railway or its
controlled companies. Hone of the interest coupons or car
trust installments due on January 1 were paid by the management,
not
It was evident, however, that the stockholders did/want a
foreclosure on tliis account. As was pointed out above, such
a foreclosure would have meant perhaps the disintegration of
the system and it was 1-xgely to prevent just this result
that the receivership had "been demanded. In order to prevent
a demand for foreclosure on any of these bonds Blair and
Company and Ladenburg, Thalman and Company offered by ad-
vertisement on January 3 to buy the coupons maturing at that
time on a long list of securities of railroads identified
with the Seaboard Air Line, also the eqiJipment bonds of the
Seaboard Air Line maturing on January 1. These purchases
were to be made at their face value. The court authorized
the receivers to borrow §754,000, with a view to reimbursing
the bankers for this outl^. The offers, however, proved to
be unnecessary for the courfe later authorized the receivers
to borrow money to discharge these specific obligations,
7ery soon movements were started for organizing
committees of the owners of various classes of bonds to
protect the interests of those securities. By the end of
January committees had been fomed to represent respectively
the Seaboard Air Line first mortgage 4 per cent bonds and
extended three year 6 per cent bonds. The interests of
these two classes of bonds were in some ways opposed. The
former represented the first lien on the property and therefore
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in any reorganization plan they would feel justified in
opposing an arbitrary scaling down of their face value. The
latter class, on the other hand,held only a junior or
secondary lien so with some justice they could he asked to
sacrifice part of their value or to submit to an exchange
for income honds or other form of security. At any event the
interests of each class were sufficiently opposed,so that
separate protective committees were deemed necessary. These
committees conferred and finally agreed upon a reorganization
committee which representeivarious interests concerned. This
committee was fomed on April 17.
Attempts were immediately made hy the receivers to
reduce operating expenses, and the first item to which thqy
directed attention was that of salaries of officers. A
reduction of wages for the general line of employees was out of
the quest ion,for the Southern Railway had only recently
"been prevented from doing this hy action of the Interstate
Commerce Commissi on. Accordingly ,on Pehmary 22, an order
was issued reducing hy 10 per cent all salaries over ^?5,000
per year and hy 8 per cent all salaries between ^3,000 and
#5,000. This was not in effect long enough to make an
appreciable showing for the fiscal year 1908, hut the results
of this policy were evident in the following year. The
annual charges for salaries of officers are given helow:-
1. Chronicle
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Salaries of officers in department of:-
1907 1908 1909
Maintenance of way and
structures ^54,650 ^62,703 ii58,134
Maintenance of equipment 38,Ec8 40,327 37,047
Iraffic expenses 39
,
208 45,070 44,575
Transportation expenses 52, 733 52,859 44,466
General officers 37,222 53,569 49,697
Total $222,207 ^254,528 ^234,019
This is an example of the policy of economy adopted "by
the receivers. The results of this policy were evident
at the end. of the first month of operation. The report^
for tne month of January 1908 is helow compared with that of
December lyU7:—
January December Change
Total operating revenue ;&il,215,680 1,254,959 -39,279
Maintenance of way 169,690 185,911 -16,221
Maintenance of equipment 207,596 200,493 7,103
Traffic expenses 50,294 51,943 - 1,649
Transportation expenses 468,566 558 ,378 -89,812
General expenses 36,285 44.281 - 7,998
Total operating expenses $932, 431 1,041,018 -108,577
Uet operating revenue 283,249 213,951 69,298
Taxes 49,250 49 , 250
Operating inc ome 233,999 164,701 69,298
The ratio of cost of conducting transportation to gross
earnings in January was less than 43 per cent; in jDecemher
1, Annual Report of 1909.
2. Monthly Report in Wall Street Journal, March 25, 1908.
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it was 48,6 per cent; and for the fiscal ye§.r 1907 it was 47 #6
per cent.
It will "be remem'bered that in all the history of the
Seahoard since its consolidation in 1900 "both classes of stock
had been held and voted by a voting trust, John Skelton
Williams had favored this system during the early history
of the Greater Seaboard Air Line,but after the New York
interests gained control he opposed it strongly, pointing out
that the voting trust v/as never intended to be permanent*
By a voting trust the power of management is separated
from the ownership, and therefore it is sometimes condemned
for separating responsibility and pov;er. However, in a case
like the Seaboard where the market value of the stock represents
but a very small part of the value of the property, the
bondholders* interests will probably be better conserved by a
voting trust, which will presumably hold to a single policy
over a period of time, than by the general body of shareholders,
who are liable to sudden changes of policy, due to change of
ownership of the very cheap stock.
As a result of this long standing opposition, an agreement
which provided for the dissolution of the voting trust was
made on December 31st, 1907, between John Skelton Vifilliams
and the counsel for the New York group. In accordance with
this agreement , the voting trustees gave notice on March 31
to the holders of the certificates that they had decided to
dissolve the voting trust agreement; and that they ?/ould make
delivery of certificates of capital stock in exchange for the
voting trust certificates, and called for said exchange on
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May 15 •
In spite of the economy exercised by the receivers, it
was found necessary to pass the payment of interest on the
^12,775,000 of series "a" bonds which was due on April 1,^
The receivers did however succeed on paying interest on the
pquipraent trust bonds.
It was necessary that the receivers should raise money
in some way
,
so they proposed to the court an issue of
receivers* certificates. The proposition Y>^as approved by
the Circuit Court on April 18. These certificates were to
be at 6 per cent and have a lien on all the property of the
road prior even to the first mortgage ,4 per cent bonds. They
were to be dated May l^and to run for three ye ars ,sub ject to
call after six months. The amounts and purposes of these
certificates were as follows:
-
Series A
To pay is^60,000 for interest and
1200,000 on account of the
principle of a loan made to the
Bailroad by the Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company (about) iii>260,000
Series B
To provide for sundry require-
ments, (about) ^2,304,000
Glaih.s having statutory prefer-
ence ^493,063
1, Moody Manual, 1910 - p.
2, Chronicle, April 4, 1908
3, ibid.
1021
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Payments by receivers on account
of car trusts, taxes, interest on
mortgages, traffic balance, and
statutory liens ^ 964,676
Interest due before July 2,
1908 on underlying mortgages,
incSiuding interest paid
April 1, 1908 1,054,975
Payments on equipment agree-
ments maturing before July 2,
1908 577,419
Rentals accrued prior to re-
ceivership 9,943
Notes and bonds secured by
terminals etc., 44,900
Sums payable of completion
of shops, bridges, etc., 15 9 , 875
Total ^3,505,551
The receivers' certificates were secured as follows:
(1) as a primary security^they were a first lien on the
surplus income derived from the operation of the Seaboard
property of the receivers, after the payment of expenses of
operations and of the receivership.
(2) As an ultimate security^they were a prior lien on
the property of the Seaboard Air Line.
The annual interest chagge on these certificates was
about i?180,000* Thus it is evident that they were an ex-
ceptionally good investment and they were easily disposed of
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thru a New York syndicate.
In the meantime, the receivers went on making improvements
and settling the floating dehts of the Company. The Baltimore
Sun of August of 18, reported that the Seaboard Air line
receivers were at work on the improvements outlined to the
court at the time they were authorized to issue the receivers'
cert ificates» These included new terminals at Tampa, Florida^
and iron bridges in place of wooden bridges along the line.
12,000 tons of steel rails were purchased ,and piers were
provided at Charleston for handling coal from a branch
1
line recently es:tended into the West Virginia coal fields.
It v;as estimated by the receivers that construction under
wajT- in August v/oiild entail an expense of about iS'1,500, 000.
This policy v;as continued so that in February of 1909 it was
estimated thst the improvements at that time progected would
2
cost in the aggregate about s^3, 500,000.
To provide the funds for this policy of extension,
for the acquisition of new equipment, and to pay interest on
underlying obligation, the receivers made on January 1, 1909
a new issue of receivers' certificates, to the amount of
^4,250,000, to be knor/n as series "c". In security offered
they were similar to series "a" and "b". They v;ere to pay
5 per cent and mature in three years,but they were subject to
1. This line ?;as the Carolina, Glinchfield and Ohio,
285 miles in length, built for the purpose of getting an outlet
for the coal of the Cumberland corporation in Virginia and
West Virginia. The road was financed by Blair and Company c.nd
other interests friendly to the Seaboard. ( Chronicle, September
12, 1908).
2. Chronicle 88: 376.
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call "before that time."^
Of course, all parties looked forward to the reorgani-
zation of the finances of the road that would enahle it, with
average earnings, to maintain it self • As a first step
towards this end^a reorganization committee of fifteen members
was formed on April 18 ,lDut nothing v/as done during 1908 to
perfect a plan of reorganization*
By the spring of 1909 prospects appeared good for paying
interest and having a safe surplus. The country was recover-
ing from the financial depression. Thus it appeared an
opportune time to "bring forth a reorganization plan. Before
stating this plan, however, it may "be well to give the results
of the two years' operation "by the receivers.
The earnings and expenses for the two years had he en
E
as follows:-
Operating revenue
1909
5116,451,676
1908
5^15,675,449
Operating expenses 11.446.052 11,979.919
Het operating revenue 5,005,644 3,695,530
Ket revenue from outside
operations -15,682 -2.608
Total net revenue 4,991,962 3,692,922
Taxes 623,935 600.500
Operating income 4,368,027 5,092,4l2
Other income 155,452 48.072
Gross corporate income 4,525,479 5,140,494
Deductions 4,035.298 3.826,367
Ket corporate income 488,187 -685,873*
*Deficit
1. Wall Street Journal Pecemher 5, 1908
2, Interstate Commerce Gomiaission Report for 1909
p, 496 and 1908 - p. 538. j_
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Operating ratio 69.57 percent 76.42 per cent
Ihe increase of operating revenue was due ,of course, to the
return of prosperity^tut the reduction "both relatively end
absolutely of operating expenses was due to the policy of
strict economy mentioned above. The great reduction of
Oi;erating ratio - 76.42 to 69.57 will he noticed. The re-
ceivers had paid the interests maturing on all the underlying
divisional bonds of the system, thus forestalling a possible
attempt to bresi up the system by selling it in parts. They
had also paid the interest on the bonds of series "b" and
series "c" and on the bonds of the subsidiary lines endorsed
or guaranteed by the Seaboard, to the extent that those lines
themselves had failed to make siich pasrments. But it v/ill be
remembered that interest had been defaulted on the ^12,775,000
of first mortgage 4 per cent bonds (series "a") and on the
^6,545,000 bonds of series "d". Interest was also in default
on the ^7,000,000 of 6 per cent note designated above as series
"e".
Besides the funded debt, as above stated^there was out-
standing June SO, 1909, receivers' certifi cates, as follows:-
Series Date Rate Amount
A June 15, 1908 6 per cent ^5,000,000
B June 16, 1908 6 per cent 260,000
C January 1, 1909 5 per cent 4.250.000
Total Jii7, 510,000
Vifith such results as these the road was ready for a
reorganisation and discharge from the control of the receivers.
In the latter part of April 1909 the. general reorganization
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committee appointed a sub-committee ,which was to construct
and. present a detailed pUjan of reorganization. Besides the
chairman,this committee was made up of representatives of the
following groups and interests: the Continental Trust Company
of Baltimore ,which was trustee for the first mortgage honds;
the stockholders of the Seahoard Company; the holders of old
Seaboard Air Line stock; the holders of collateral trust
bonds; a representative for all the stock; and a representative
for all the bonds. Early in June_,a plan was ready^ known
as the adjustment plan. This was approved by the general
reorganization corrxmittee and was dated July 1, 1909.
1. Railway Age Gazette, April E2, 1909.
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V
REORGMIZATIOH PliAH OF 1909
The plan presented ,and later adopt ed^was substenti ally-
as follows; - The various classes of securities will "he
referred to "by their series letter as well as "by title for
convenience of comparison with the above description of the
funded deht*
(1) The v^7,510,000 of receivers' certificates and the
1700,000 of 6 per cent notes, series "e", were to fee paid
in full with interest. The money for this purpose was to
be provided by the method described below in paragraph 6.
(2) The foi:! owing bonds were to remain undisturbed:
the 30, 400, 000 of divisional bonds series "f " ; and the
112,775,000 first mortgage bond series "a"; the ^10,000,000
of 5 per cent series "b"; and the ^4,661,000 of the collateral
trust bonds of series "c"«
(3) The capital stock was to remain undisturbed and
was not called upon for assessment,
(4) The Seaboard Air Line should continue liable for
all its debts and obligations which included its guarantee
of interest on the bonds of certain subsidiary companies.
(5) The holders of first mortgage bonds, series "a",
were to receive all matured and unpaid interest in cash^but
they should agree that their bonds could be redeemed by
the co.-pany at par and accrued interest at any interest
payment dg-te* '
(6) A new form of security ,known as adjustment bonds
^
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were to "be authorized to the amount of C)25,000,000. They
were to he curaiilative income honds bearing 5 per cent interest
•
By the sale ofN;^18,000,000 of these honds at 70, money
would he provided for the retiring of receivers' certificates
(see paragraph 1) and for other purposes mentioned helow.
The Scile of these honds had already heen underwritten.
(7) The ^6,345,000 of 5 per cent honds (series "d")
were to he exchanged for an equal amount of adjustment honds
described in the above aparagraph. i^or interest matured on
these bonds of .series "d", adjustment honds were to be given
at their face value.
(8) This provided for the immediate needs of the company,
but from the past experiences of the Seaboard it was evident
that some method should be devised for providing new capital-
for the future development of the property and for the
refunding of existing bonds as they matured. To provide
for these future needs ;;?125,000,000 of 4 per cent refunding
mortgage bonds were to be authorized and held ready for
issue when needed.
(9) Besides these adjustments of securities ^it was pro-
vided to vest in the Seaboard Air Line by sale, merger, con-
solidation or otherwise, the properties of the following
subsidiary railroads; Atlanta & Birmingham Air Line; Atlantic,
Sewanee River and Gulf jcatawbai Valley Railway; Florida
V/est Shore; Plant City, Arcadia and Gulf; Roanoke and Tar
River; Seaboard and Roanoke, Talahassee, Perry and Southeast-
em and of practically all other railway companies whose
stock was largely o?/ned by the Seaboard Air Line Railway.
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Having stated the plsn as ontlined by the committee,
we will attempt an analysis and a comparison of some of its
features with those of other reorganization plcjis.
It may first of all he asked if this rearrangement of
finances and securities was in reality a reorganization.
The conceptions of receivership, foreclosure, and reorganizatioi;^
as applied to railways are often confused. The meanings
attached to these words have changed from time to time
and with changes in practice. But both in practice and
theory to-day, it is possible to have a receivership without
a foreclosure or a reorganization. Professor Ripley defines
a receivership as " the continuing control of a railway by
an officer appointed by a Federal or State Court v^^ho in
cases of dispute or litigation assumes the management on
behalf of all parties concerned, including the public,with
its right to uninterrupted service .""^ So the receivers may
merely operate the road for a time until it is again on its
feet and then discharge it .without a foreclosure sale, or a
to
reorganization of its finances. As/the possible separation
in theory of reorganization and foreclosure ,there is some
difference of opinion. Cleveland says that a reorganization
is not possible without a foreclosure. But as Professor
Rip]ey points out, it is quite as possible to have a radical
readjustment of capitalization because of extreme prosperity,
as because of financial failure. The first reorganization of
the Rock Island, ih 1880, was due to extremely high earnings
1. "Railro,ads," Vol. II, Chapter xii.
2. Railway ifinance - p. 247.
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and the consequent desire to extend capitalization. Almost
the ssme can be said of its reorganization of 1907 under the
Moore-Reid interests. In neither case was there a receivership
or a f reel sure ,hut the changes were so radical and far
reaching that it seems illogical to refuse to them the term,
of reorganization. But if we accept Professor Ripley s
definition that reorganization is a financial readjustment,
or if we follow Stuart Daggett, when he attempts to establish
a more definite concept for purposes of study, by restricting
the term reorganization to "the exchange of new securities
for the principle of oiitst anding, unmatured, general mort-
gage bonds, or for at least 50 per cent of the unmatured
junior mortgages of any company or for the whole of the
capital stock" - if we accept either of these ideas,we must
^pply the tem reorganization to the readjustments of Seaboard
finances both in 1905 and 1909.
As to the first item fhove mentioned - it was of course
inevitable that receivers' certificates and the 6 per cent
notes should be paid in full. Receivers' certificates
hold a practical]_yimpregnable position. They have a prior
claim to any of J the bond issues, and so in a reorgfmization
plan need not compromise at all. The ^700,000 of short time
notes, being secured by good collatereJ., were also in a
pesition v/here no sacrifices could be demanded of them.
The large proportion of bonds that remained undisturbed
was dn evidence of the very conservative nature of this re-
organization. Taking up each of these four classes of bonds_,
I.Daggett, Railroad Reorganization - p. 513.
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mentioned in paragraph 2 .of the reorganization plan, let us
see what claim each of them had on tangible property. The
$30,400,000 of divisional "bonds series "f" were in the strong-
est position. They largely represented the indebtedness of
the various lines "before the consolidation. Consequently,
most of these "bonds had a prior lien to the first mortgage
bonds ^and if they insisted the various divisions would be
sold separately at foreclosure. Time, many of these branches
would be of little value except as a part of the system.
Therefore, such an extreme measure was very improbable, but
it was a possibility - and an effective one.
Next in order of priority of claim came the ^12,775,000
of first mortgage bonds, series "a". These were part of an
authorized issue of §75,000,000. They had a first claim on
1
the system as a whole.
The collateral trust bonds series "b", also had a
very substantial claim for they were secured by a deposit of
^20,000,000 first mortgage bonds series "a" which has just
been discussed. Consequently they too were left undistt.rbed.
Then there were the collateral trust bonds of series"c"«
It will be remembered that these were the bonds which were
issued in 1904 and with each of which was given a bonus of
$900 of preferred stock and ^1600 of common stock. Consider-
ing this excessive liberality ,the holders of these bonds could
1. As these bonds represent the whole system their
quotations on the bond market act as a barometer of the
confidence of the investing public in the road. A chart
has been included in the appendix to show the fluctuation
in the Seaboard Air Line first mortgage bond.
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have had no just complaint if they had "been called upon to
sacrifice part of the value of their "bonds or to suhmit to a
lowering of their interest rate. Evidence is not availahle
however that this was even suggested.
Let us next consider the provisions of paragraph 5 of the
reorganization plan. This referred to capital stock. As a
general rule the stockholders have little ^oice in a re-
organization. They are the proprietors; the "bondholders
are the creditors. As the stockholders have had the manage-
ment of the property and have hrought it to failure, it is
only Just to demand that their creditors should "be satis-
fied,and that the stockholders should "bear the cost. This
adjustment of loss is usually "brought at out by an assessment
of stock. While this of course means a sacrifice^it leaves
the control in the hands of the stockholders , and gives them
a chance to share in the future prosperity of the road. The
amount that can he demanded depends, of course, upon the
prospective e -ming power of the stock ,otherwise the stock-
holders would refuse to pay the assessment and yield up
their stock. This assessment of stockier raising money from
within, as it is sometimes called, is ,according to Professor
Daggett , "the soundest method of raising cash. It disposes
of the accumulated quick lia"bilities once for all; and
involves no subsequent increase in interest charges."^ In
nearly all cases have the stockholders regained their added
investments by an increase in value of the stock. In almost
every reorganization of recent years,there has been an
1, Railroad Reorganization - p. 354,
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assessment of stock. That there was none in this case is
undoubtedly due to (1) a large numher of "bondholders "being at
the same time stockholders , and thereby exerting great influence
in the reorganization committee. Ihis is quite possible, for
much of the stock had been issued as a bonus to bond pur-
chasers. liVhether or not they still remained in the hands of
the original owners, is largely a matter of conjecture. (Z)
Another reason perhaps, was the low market value of the stock.
It would have been impossible to collect a very substantial
assessment on stock on which the holders placed little value,
and further j(3) the floating debt was not such a problem
as in most reorganizations and, therefore, ready cash was not
so badly needed.
As to the fourth item of the plan,the company could
hardly avoid liability for its floating debt, as no court would
countenance a refusal by the company to pay for supplies and
labor it had received. As for its guarantee of the bonds
of its subsidiary companies ,the practice of reorganization
committees is somewhat different. Very often are burdensome
guarantees, contracts, or leases abrogated. Hov/ever^in this
case it was not an important question for the most important
of the roads whose bonds had been guarnateed were,by the
reorganization plan,consolidated with the Seaboard Air Line.
The first mortgage 4 per cent bonds, as was to be expected,
were to receive all matured and unpaid interest. Three
1. One example of such cancellation of a lease is
found in the action of Judge Jenkins of the Milwaukee
Cd)urt in September 189b when he allovved the Northern
Pacific to cancel its lease of the Wisconsin Central property
because the receivers reported that during the three years
of the least it had represented a loss. - ( Chronicle, ^||gt^ 30,
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semi annual interest dates had been passed without the payment
of interest. As a fair return to the company for the payment
of this past-.' due interest, it was demanded that the bonds
should he made redeemable at par. This concession might at
some time be of value to the company but has not proved so
to date for the reason that these bonds have never reached
par, and to redeem them would mean a considerable loss to the
company. These bonds ranged between 85 and 86 during the
latter half of the fiscal year 1914.-^
The issuing of income bonds known as adjustment bonds to
raise cash and to exchange for the general mortgage bonds,
series "d'\was in line with modem financial practice.^ It
would probably have been wiser to raise the needed money
from within, that is, by assessment of stock. But if additional
securities were to be sold,this form was undoubtedly the
most desirable. Income bonds sell better than preferred stocky
probably because of the habit of considering anything called
a bond a better security than stock. As a matter of f act^
1. Chronicle July E7, 1914.
2. The bonds are dated October 1, 1909 and mature
October 1949. Interest is payable semi-annu,aiy at a rate
not to succeed 5 per cent per annum as determined by the Board
of Directors. The company agrees that no dividends shall be
paid upon its stock until all interest in arrears, if there be
any, shall have been paid. The Board of Directors may at
any time direct the payment of any or all interest in arrears
whether on regular interest dates or not. Furthermore, the
company may if it desires pay interest otherwise than from
net earnings and income. - Moody's Manual 1910. - p. 1023(Not verbatim)
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the lien of an income "bond is of little value and furthermore
the holder of an income bond cannot participate in the
control of a company^ Nevertheless , as income bonds are
preferred by the investing public tc preferred stock,their use
is increasing. They were of course, preferable to ordinary
interest bearing bonds on which charges must be paid on
pair, of bankruptcy. Professor Daggett has shown that the
tendency of practice since 1893 as compared with the
practice before that date has been to reduce such charges.
In the reorganizations which he examined before 1895, there
was a slight increase of fixed charges; in those from 1893
to 1898 there was a decrease of fixed charges of 30,9 per cent.
The use of the income bond or some kind of stock to displace
the regular interest bearing bond is, of coarse, one method
of bringing about this desired end.
|18,000,000 of these adjustment bonds were to be sold
at 70 per cent,^ The reorganization committee stated the
proposed dispesition of the cash to be received from this sale
as follows :
-
Proceeds from the sale of |18,000,000 adjustment bonds
at 70, after deducting 5 per cent underwriting commission
111,700,000
Receivers* certificates |7, 610, 000
Two year notes and interest -763,000
Three coupons of series "a" 766,000
Leaving applicable toward
floating debt, interest,
1. Railroad Reorganization - p. 357,
2. R;^nge of this security in 1913 - p# 66-75.
I
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expenses of receivership,
expenses and compensation
of the comrnittee, etc, 2.661,000
1
111.700,000
We now come to that clause of the reorganization plan
which provided for the exchange of the 5 per cent "bonds,
series "b", for the above described income bonds. The bonds
of series "b" were secured (1) by a general mortgage on the
property of the Seaboard Air Line and (E) by the deposit
in trust of (a) certain stocks of other companies and (b)
^20,000,000 first mortgage series"a". Tho secured by a
"general mortgage" they had a very unsubstantial claim on
actual property, for the mortgage by which they were secured
was preceded by that of series "a" on the property of the
road. Their claim on the ^20,000,000 bonds of series "a",
held in trust »was preceded by that of the collateral trust
bonds,series "c"^ and that by the collateral tirust bonds^series
"b". In brief then, their security was (1) a second lien on
about 350, miles of road, (2) a third lien on ibout 2,030
miles of road, (3) a third lien on |20,000,000 first mortgage
bond series "a" and (4) a second lien on $7,068 of stocks
and bonds of various companies. It will remembered (page 2.1 )
that these bonds were part of an authorised issue of ^18,000,000
which were dated February 1, 1907, The authorization of these
bonds was part of the reorgajiization plan of 1905, The issu-
ing of ^6,345,000 was part of the policy of improvement and
expansion which seized the manc.gement in the latter pL.rt of
1. Railway Age Gazette 47:82.
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1906 ^and was carried out thru 1907, leading to the deficit
at the end of that fiscal year. Most of them had teen dis-
posed of them to stockholders at 90 at the same time (JFehrusry
2, 1907) that the three year collateral trust bonds series
"c" were selling at one-half point above par, and the first
1
mortgage "bond series "a" were quoted at 81» If one class
of "bonds was to he picked out to bear the loss incident to
a reorganization, this class was undoubtedly the proper one
for such purpose. The security upon which they rested
was, as we hsive seen, not very substantial. The purchasers
were aware of this when they bought the bonds ^so no injustice
woi^-ld be done by requiring them to bear the loss as one
of the fortunes of speculation*
The new 4 per cent ,refunding mortgage ,bonds^mentioned in
paragraph 8. of the plan,may be described as follows;- The
amount authorized was ^125,000,000 and the time of maturity
50 years from date of issue» They were subject to call at
105 and interest at pjiy interest date. ^^75, 000,000 of them
2
were reserved for the following purposes :-
To retire underlying divifc^nal bonds ^30,405,000
To retii^e first mortgage series "a" 12,775,000
To retire three year bonds series "c" 4,651,000
To retire ten year bonds series "b" 10,000,000
To retire equipment trust obligations 6,000,000
For double tracking, reducing grades, etc. 4,000,000
For other betterments, improvements etc. 4,424,000
1. Chronicle 84:260
2.. Moody's Manual 1910 - p. 1024,
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To aid in collateral trust and
first mortgage "bonds "but only
at request of three-fourths of
Bo<,vrd of Directors 2,750.000
1)75,000,000
The remaining ii,^50,0d0 authorized, could only be issued at a
rate not exceeding ^:;£,750,000 per year and only under specified
conditions. The security^ of course,would be that of the bonds
retired cind in addition the ^i)5,500, first mortgage bonds, series
"a", formerly in the treasury or pledged for the floating debt.
The first offering of these bonds was for ^s-ig , 000 , 000 at 83
per cent in April 1911 to retire the three year,and five year^
5 per cent bonds coming due at that time. There were out-
standing June 30, 1914,iii>24,010,000 of this class of bonds.
The last item of the reorganization plan dealt with the
merger of the various lines whose stcck had been held largely
by the Seaboard Air Line. The various roads involved are
mentioned above. This was the final step in that actual
consolidation which^as we have seen,began in 1897 and 1900,
was pushed further in 1905, and nov/ 7/as completed by combining
the property all under one name. This is an illustration of
the fact that financial failure of a road tends tov/ard dis-
integration, but a reorganization tends to greater consolidation,
The effect here was not as it often is to reduce rents for the
consolidated lines had not been leased. Neither did it reduce
the number of bond issues for the bonds of the various companies
remained as divisional bonds ttnder the Seaboard Air Line.
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Summary:- The reorganization of 1909 was extremely
conservative. It was called for by the stockholders ,and they
wielded a great influence thruovit the receivership and
reorgsnization. The stock was not assessed. Most of the bonds,
even those of junior lien, were not disturbed, Fixed charges
were somewhat reduced by the substitution of income bonds
for fixed interest bonds. Provision was made for the
capital needs of the growing company. A considerable
improvement in the property had been made under receivership.
Having accomplished these results ,the receivers ^in llovember
1909,turned over the control of the property to the stock-
holders.
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VI
TEE SEABOAED AIE LINE SINCE 1909
Since the reorganization of 1909 there has "been a steady
improvement of the Seahoard's financial standing. How much of
this has "been due to the conservative readjustment of
finances of that year, it is hard to say. Certain it is,however,
that much of this improvement must he ascribed to the general
development of the industries of the South, In the six years
the gross earnings from operatioh have increased from !!j;17,624,49e
to |i£5, 291,758. During the same time operating expenses
Xhefore deducting taxes) increased from $12,216,805 to
^^17, 311, 395. Or stated in terms of percentage - the operat-
ing ratio of 69..84 in 1909 and had only decreased to 68.44
in 1914.
The adjustment bonds created by the reorganization of
1909 were all sold by December 1910. It will be remembered
that the stockholders of the road h^id been given an option
on these securities at 70. It was expected that a considerable
share of them v/ould be taken in this way but the shareholders
availed themselves of this option only to the extent of
5i^l, 500,000. They consequently sold thru a syndicate and
a considerable portion, estimated between ^5,000,000 and
vl5,000,000 were taken by English investors. As a result of
this purchase, vy. Wighsm of London was elected to the Board
of Directors. These securities by the time they were all
sold were quoted at 76.
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In the latter part of 1911 and the early part of 1912
there was taking place a quiet purchasing of stock by certaiii
Southern shareholders ,with the result of course^that the
demands of this class were coming to be more and more respected.
We will return again to this subject of shifting control
but mention it here as a probable cause of the dissolution
of the Seaboard Compajoy. The Southern c apitalists ,it will
be remembered, had never been entirely in sympatliy with the
idea! of the holding company^but had continued to protest
against it and the policies of its backers. After a few years'
trial they seemed to have a better case than ever for the
Seaboard compajiy had been formed to furnish .needed capital
especially in the event of a business depression. It had
utterly failed to accomplish this desired result. So in the
autumn of 1911 it was finally decided by the holders of Sea-
board Air Line stock (which meant very largely the Seaboard
company itself) to dissolve the holding company. On Janui-ry
2, 1911, the plan of dissolution was submitted to the vote
of the stockholders and was unanimously approved. The share
of the proceeds to go to each class in the event of dissolution
had been determined by the Seaboard Air Line shsreholders in
1905 at the time of the foming of the new company. The con-
dition of the company at the time of the dissolution was as
follows. The Seaboard company had in the latter part of 1911
sold to a syndicate of which Blair and Company and Ladenburg,
Thalman and Company were managers, #6,700,000 of its holdings
of Seaboard Air Line adjustment lines^and had sold to the
baiilvers themselves for their own account the small remainder
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of such holdings amounting to about iij)85,900. These "bonds,
a small amount of cash on hand, and ;gi900,100 Seaboard Air
Line railway notes payable on demsjad constituted the entire
cash of the company except its holdings in Seaboard Air Line
railway preferred and common stock,
The holdings of the Seaboard company were to be dis-
tributed as follows: (1) The holdings of common stock of the
railway compyjoy amoiig the common stockholders of the Seaboard
company, about 1,03 shares of railway common stock being
given for each share of Seaboard company common stock, (£)
its holdings of preferred stock of the railway to be dis-
tributed among the second preferred stockholders ,about toe and
one-third shares of railway preferred stock to each share of
Seaboard company second preferred stock, and (2) the proceeds
of all its other assets among its first preferred stockholders
which it was estimated would provide par in cash for each share
of Seaboard company first preferred stock* It will be remember-
ed that in forming the Seaboard company each share of the
Seaboard Air Line stock was required to pay an assessment of
il2»50 and to be surrendered to the Seaboard company. In
return among other things it received st^lE.SO of Seaboard
company first preferred stock. So the paying for these
securities in cash at their face value was justified by the
assessment of seven years prior*
Another interesting development in Seaboard affairs
took place in 1912. This was the purchase of a majority of
stock by Southern investors and the consequent shift in
control from New York to the South. S. Davies Warfield,
1. Chronicle 1911, December 9.
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of Baltimore, purchased a block of 90,000 shares of preferred
and 120,000 shares of common stock from the CTimherland Corporation
We referred ahove to a proposed alliance of the Seahoard Air
Line with the Carolina, Clinchfield and Ohio. This road and
certain coalfields^ mentioned ahove^in connection with the road,
were held hy the Gnraherland Corporation, The holding of Seahoard
Stock was evidently part of the plan of forming a community of
interests. The only importance of this in the present connection
is that the Gumherland Corporation ,needing funds to meet certain
maturing notes , decided to provide them hy the sale of Seahoard
stock. In making this purchase ,Warfield was representing
a syndicate of the leading capitalists of the state of the South
traversed hy the Seahoard Air Line; also certain New York men.
The former were in the majority. The block of stock was to be
placed in the hands of trustees for five years, Mr. ?/arfield
being chairman of the mimagers. The syndicate, it was announced,
would control a majority of the stock ($27,019,000 common and
$22,894,000 preferred) of the Seaboard Air Line railway.
There was considerable enthusiasm for the new management.
The Seabo£ird was proclaimed as a distinctly southern .property,
and it was asserted that now the South' s position in Seaboard
affairs would be emphasized. The Board of Directors was to
include representative business and financial men of the Southern
states and thereafter the meetings of the directors would be
held at the offices at Baltimore ,the "natural gateway of the
South."
To represent the new control W. J. Earahan^at that time
1. Chronicle May 25, 1912.
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vice-president of the Erie Railroad^ and formerly general manager
of the Illinois Central^was elected president. There had been
considerable dissatisfaction with the old management. The
operating ratio in 1912 had been 71.02 as compcTed with 66.48
in 1911. With larger gross earnings from operation than ever
before the year had ended with a net corporate income of
less than that of 1911. But now,with the new Southern directors
and their new president, confidence again returned.
An aggressive policy of betterment and extension was
immediately adopted. In February of 1913,^6,000,000 of three-
year, 5 per cent notes were issued to be used for improvements.
About the same time the Tampa and Gulf Coast railroad, a line of
77 miles was built and the Seaboard Air Line guaranteed the
p,ayment of interest on its bonds. In like manner a close connect-
ion is maintained with the h6rth and the South Carolina railroad,
though in neither case does the Seaboard Air Line own the
capital stock of the smaller company^ nor is their milage included
in the total milage operated by the Seaboard Line railway.
I>uring the fiscal year 1914, as will be noted by the
income accounts, a fair increase of gross earnings over any pre-
ceding year was reported. ^716,823 were paid out as dividends
on the preferred stock. A fair amount was spent on maintenance
of equipment and maintenance of way. All in all it was a good
year. The coming of the depression in the South due to the
European war has, of course, lowered gross earnings. The directors
immediately decided to pass dividends on the preferred stock.
This brings us to the end of the last fiscal year.
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At the outset of any attempt to arrive at a general
statement of the progress of the Seatoard since its consolidation
in 1901, it must te said that the high hopes and extravagant
predictions of success have not "been entirely realized, A rapid
brilliant rise was expected as a result of the consolidation.
But the increase in size of the system, the change in form of
traffic handled, and the consequent needs of adopting new
methods and new equipment
,
gave rise to unforeseen prohlems.
However the years 1901 to 1914 have brought a slow "button the
whole, a steady growth. The increase in milage has not "been
large. as compared v>rith that of some other roads,"but the reason
for this seems to he that the system as estahllshed in 1901
made a rather natural unit of operation. Its need was more for
intensive than extensive development. The addition of certain
branch and connecting lines has increased the miles operated
from 2,484 in 1901 ,to 3,084 in 1914.
In 1901 ^the gross earnings from operation were |10,426,E79;
they have increased rather consistently to ;ip25,291,757 in 1914,
Passenger earnings increased from. iipl,978,780 to ^5,430,551;
freight earnings have increased from ii>7, 282,432 to ^17,307,034.
Incidentally , there is in these figures good evidence of the
industrial development of the South Atlantic Seaboard states.
With the increase of earnings the percentage devoted to
maintenance of way, structures and equipment has not declined.
It was 25.23 per cent of gross earnings in 1901 and 25.69 per cent
in 1914. Besides the improvements charged to income account
_>
there have been various issues of securities as we have noted
above, for improvements of property.
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The weight of rails has "been improved. The following
table shows the weight of rails in the main line in 1901 and
1914 respectively:-
1914Weight of
rails per
yard
1901
90 pounds 11 miles
85 346 39
80 75 124
75 1207
70 J.DO
68 ElO 201
65 18 £0
63.5 60 5
60 536 1321
58 205
56- and lighter 258 552
Iron rails 88
Thus it is seen that the weight now most common on the Seahoard
lines ^exclusive of sidetracks and second tracks, is 70 pounds
steel ,as contrasted with 60 pounds steel in 1901. Nevertheless,
there is still much to he done for from the ahove table we find
that 1243 miles of line still have rails of less th-n 70 pounds
per yard - that is, rails incapable of handling traffic by the
most modern methods.
The Seaboard when incorporated had 294 locomotives; on
Junft 30, 1914 it had 525. The number of passenger cars and
freight cars were respectively 259 and 8335 in 1901, and 371
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and 17,851 in 1914.
Another indirect evidence of improvement is the redaction
of percentage of gross earnings consumed by fixed charges and
conducting transportation from 72.4 to 63.1. This ,it will be
noted^is a different thing from" operating ratio", which is the
term used to describe that proportion of gross earnings used
in operating expenses^of which conducting transportation is but
one part, and which of course does not include "fixed charges".
Ihe operating ratio of the Seaboard was 70.98 in 1901 and
68.45 in 1914. UoiTnally, according to Professor Ripley ,it lies
I
between 50 and 75. For the railways of the United States as
a whole it haa risen from 64.6 in 1900 ^to 71.7 in 1913.
The Southern Railway in 1914 had an operating ratio of 74.1 and the
1
I
I
Atlantic Coast Line in the same year 71.9. Methods of account-
ing, financial policy, etc., remaining the same, a decline of
operating ratio is an evidence of efficient operation. It has
a great effect on the price of securities for the difference
j
between the operating ratio and 100 per cent measures roughly
the so-called margin of safety of both stocks and bonds.
A matter which is not directly connected with railway
finance but which is of fmndamental importance in the success of
a road is the density of traffic, passenger and freight.
In the respect the roads of the granger territory, as for example,
the St. Paul or the large roads of the trunk line territory
are facing an entirely different situation than the ro .ds of I
the South generally, and particularly those of the Southeast.
This condition^however^is bound to improve with the development
1. Exclusive of Taxes.
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of the South,and it must be said that the rfiilways are doing
their part thru their "industrial departments" to help along
this movement. On the Seaboard Air Line the density of freight
and passenger traffic respectively, grew from 255,465 to
510,668 and from 50,464 to 80,509 in the period 1901 to 1914.
In considering the financial stability of a company
capitalization must be examined. Professor Ripley in the book
referred to above, considers the question of safe or unsafe
capitalization to depend upon the relativity of capitalization
and earning power. Under the term capitalization he includes
all classes of bonds and preferred and common stock. ^ Would it
not be more accurate im many caaes,of which the Seaboard is
an example, to say that the question of safety depends upon
the relativity of earning power and fixe d charges. Ihe fact
that the Seaboard has ^45,995 per mile capitalization (meaning
by capitalization both stocks and bonds) is not as significant
as an evidence of stability, as is the fact that it has
156,245 of bonds on which interest must be paid under penalty of
I
foreclosure. Dividends have never been paid on the common stock
of the Seaboard Air Line. Therefore, whether the Seaboard has
^12,004 of common stock per mile as it had in 1914 or .->50,000
per mile, has little if any bearing on the safety of the company.
However, even comparing the bonded indebtedness of the
Seaboard with its net earnings, as we maintain should be done,
the showing is not good. But this seems to be because the
earning power is low, di;e to poor territory rather than
because the bonded debt is too high. This undesirable proportion
1. Annual Re-Dorts of Seaboard Air Line.
2. Railroads, Vol. II,- p. 85
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would therefore te shortly remedied by an increase of earnings.
The industrial awakening in the South necessary for such an
increase of earnings appears to be in progress and with it the
Seaboard along with other Southern roads will undoubtedly
enter upon better times.
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